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116 BARKIS II. SCOT'l' [34 C.2d 
[8. 11'. No. Ime. ID Bank. July 1, 1949.] 
WILLIAM E. BARKIS, Respondent, v. VERNER .s. SCOTT 
et aI., Appellanta. 
{I] Vendor and Purchaser-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest-
Belief from Forfeiture.-Civ. Code, ~ 3275, permitting relief 
to a party to an obligation who inC1l1'8 a forfeiture by reason 
of a failure to comply with its provisions, upon maiing full 
cODlpensation to the other party, :s available to a defaulting 
vendee under a land purchase contract when the conditions 
of the statute have been satisfied, regardless of whether or 
not time has been made of the easence of the conus ct. 
[2] Id.-Forfeiture of Purc:haaer's Interest-Relief from For-
feiture.-Where there has been a waiver of the time provision 
of a land purchasf' contract or an estoppel against the vendor 
to assert it, resort by the defaulting vendeto to relief from 
forfeiture under Civ. Code, § 8275, is not necessary. 
(Sa Sb] Id.-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest-Belief from For-
feiture.-A defaulting vendt'e may oMain relief under Civ. 
Code, § 3275, although time is made of the essence of the 
contract, where he has substantially performed the contract 
or has made substantial improvements in reliance thereon. 
{4] Forfeitures-Relief Under Statute.-Civ. Code, § 3276, pre-
supposes that the party seeking relief from a forfeiture is 
in default, and in order to secure relief under its terms it is 
necessary for him to plea!! and prove facts that will justify 
its application. 
(5] Vendor and Purchaser-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest-
Relief from Forfeiture.-In a vendor's quiet-title actioD 
against defaulting purchasers in possession of land under 
a contract making time of the essence, tbe evidence did not 
support a flnding that defendants' failure to meet tb~ir obli-
gation by issuing cheeks drawn on a bank in which they 
had insufficient funds was grossly negligent and a wilful 
breach of duty, so as to preclude them from obtaining relief 
under Civ. Code, § 3276, where they testified that they did 
not know tbat the cheeks had been dishonored until they re-
ceived plaintiff's notice of forfeiture and that they believed 
[1] See 12 Oal.Jur. 639; 26 Oal.Jur. 623; 19 Am.3ur. 99 
.cK. Dig. Roferences: [1-8,5) Vendor and Purchasers, 1136; f 
[4] Forfeitures, § 17. 
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they had tm1Beient tunds in the bank to cover the checks, and 
where their failure fully to investigate the implications of 
their bank statement amounted at moat to ample negligence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of .Ala-
meda County. Leon E. Gray, JUdge. Reversed. 
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plain-
tiff reversed. 
Eugene Elerding and Albert M. Hardie for Appellanta. 
Marshal] Rutherford and Ralph Nathanson for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants have appealed from a judg-
ment quieting plaintiff's title to a parcel of real property. 
In 1941, plaintiff and defendants executed a contract 
whereby defendants agreed to purchase plaintiff's house and 
lot in Oakland. Seven hundred dollars was paid down and 
the balance of $5,450 with 6 per cent interest was to be paid 
at the rate of $42.50 per month. The contract provided' that 
payments were to be made on the fifteenth day of each month 
and that "IF DEFAULT should be made in the payment of any 
of the said sums of principal. interest or installments at 
tnaturity thereof, all moneys theretofore paid in the premises 
by said parties of the second part shall~ at the option of said 
party of the first part. become absolutely forfeited to and 
be retained by said party of the first part, as and for liquidated 
and agreed damages for breach of this agreement; and this 
agreement shall then become and be absolutely void and of 
no effect. . .. IT BEING ExPREssLY AGREED that time is the 
essence of this contraet. . • ." Defendants went into poe-' 
session and made 57 monthly payments up to and including 
the payment due May 15, 1946. They also made permanent 
improvements on the property of the value of $3,114.47. The 
checks sent to plaintiff for the June and August payments 
were returned by the bank marked "Refer to Maker." The 
July check was honored. On August 26, 1946. plaintiff noti. 
fied defendants that he had elected to declare a forfeiture 
of their interest under the contract for the defaults in the 
June and August payments. Plaintiff was not aware that 
the June check bad been dishonored when he accepted the 
JUly payment, and defendants were not aware that either 
check had been dishonored until they received plaintiff'. 
) 
j 
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notice of forfeiture. After the notice of forfeiture was 
ceived, defendants immediately tendered certified checks 
the amounts due, but plainti1f refused to accept them. 
fendants then opened an account under the provisions 
section 1500 of the Civil Code and have deposited to Dla.intifUIl 
credit all amounts that have become due under the contract. 
Defendants contend that the retention of the July 
ment by plaintiff amounted to a waiver of the Drc)wliollll, 
making time of the essence and providing for a for'fei'turel 
in case of default, and that regardless of whether there 
any waiver, the trial court should have relieved them 
default nnder the provisions of section 3275 of the 
Code. Since it is clear that defendants are entitled to 
under section 3275, it is unnecessary to decide whether 
was a waiver of the defaults in making either the June 
A ugust payments. 
[1] Section 3275 provides: "Whenever, by the terms 
an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a 
in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to 
comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom. 
upon making full compensation to the other party, except in 
case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fradulent breach of 
duty. " Although by iw terms this section authorizes relief 
in this case, plaintiB contends that it is the settled law of 
this state that such relief is unavailable to a defaulting vendee 
under a contract where time has been made of the essence. 
The decisions that have considered section 3275, however, 
have been careful to point out in granting or denying relief 
that the party in default has or has not brought himself 
within the terms of the statute, and whenever its conditions 
have been satisfied relief has been granted whether or not 
time had been made of the essence by the contract involved. 
(Gonzau, v. Hirose, 33 Cel.2d 213, 215-216 [200 P.2d 793}; 
Leslie v. Federal Finance Co., Iftc., 14 Cal.2d 73, 82 [92 P.2d 
906] ; Benck v. Lake Bemet Wafer Co., 9 CaUd 136, 143-145 
[69 P.2d 849] i Hopkifts v. Woodward, 216 Cal. 619, 621-622 
[15 P.2d 499]; Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust Co., 213 CaL 496, 
499-500 [2 P.2d 776] ; Breitman v. Gattman, 88 CaI.App.2d 
124, 128 [198 P.2d 311] ; Gattian v. COUman, 86 Cal.App.2d 
266, 270 [194 P.2d 7281 i li'ZaMry v. Mudd, 86 Cal.App.2d 
250,254-255 [194 P.2d 806]; BedeU v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 
-S06. 807-808 [182 P.2d 591] ; Miller v. Modern Motor Co., 107 
Cal.App. 38, 44-45 [290 P. 122]; FicTrbohm v. Knaust, 103 
Cal.App. 443, 446 [284 P. 692]; Eft'ght v. Black, 19 Cal. 
/ 
) 
) 
/ 
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. pp. 518, 526 [126 P. 512] ; McDonald v. Kiftgsbur1/, 16 Cal. 
.pp. 244, 247-248 [116 P. 380] ; see O'MofTOW v. Bo"tJd, 27 
!al.2d 794, 800-801 [167 P.2d 483] ; Clifford v. Fleskmaft,65 
lal.App. 762, 770 [225 P. 45]; Trougktoft v. Eakle, 58 Cal. 
I.pp. 161, 173 [208 P. 161]; Leak v. Colbum, 55 Ca1.App. 
84,788 {2M P. 249].} [I] Plainti1f contends, however~ that 
n cases where relief has been granted although time was 
nade of the essence, there had either been a waiver of the 
;ime provision or an estoppel against the vendor to assert 
it. (See GOftso.Uz v. Hirose, 33 Cal.2d 213, 216 {200 P.2d 
793] ; Flam,." v. Mudd, 86 Cal.App.2d 250, 254 {I94 P.2d 
806]; BedeU v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806,807 [182 P.2d 
591] ; MiUer v. Modem Motor Co., 107 Ca1.App. 38, 44 (290 
P. 122] ; Ftckbokm v. KMust, 103 Cal.App. 443, 446 [284 P. 
692] ; ColUm v. Eklooziaft, 61 Cal.App. 184, 197 [214 P. 670]; 
McDOttald v. Kiftgsbu,.", 16 Cal.App. 244, 248 [116 P. 380].) 
It is settled, however, that if waiver or estoppel . is found, 
resort to relief under section 3275 is not necessary. (McCarl-
1&61/ v. CampbeU, 216 Cal. 715, 720 [16 P.2d 729] ; LaffoOft v. 
CoUim, 212 Cal. 750, 755 [300 P. 808] ; Butte Creek Comol. 
D. Co. v. Olm1/, 173 Cal. 697, 708 [161 P. 260]; Cit1/ of Los 
,4ftgeles v. Krutz, 170 Cal. 344, 347 [149 P. 5801 ; 8tet1imOft 
v. JOf/, 164 Cal. 279, 285 [128 P. 7511; Ba1/t v. Beftfe!, 164 
Cal. 680, 685 [130 P. 4321; Boofte v. Templemaft, 158 Cal. 
290,295,297 [110 P. 947,139 Am.St.Rep. 1261; LebaUister v. 
MorN, 59 Cal.App. 699, 702-703 [211 P. 851].) Accordingly, 
the waiver or ~toppel found in those cases that also relied 
on section 3275 must be considered as an alternate ground 
of decision rather than a condition to relief under that section, 
and BOme of those cases have expressly BO held. (MiUer v. 
Modem Motor Co., 107 Oal.App. 88, 45 [290 P. 122J; Pick-
bokm v. KMust, lOS Cal.App. 443, 446 [284P. 692]; see, 
also, O'MOfTow v. Borad, 27 0al.2d 794, 800 [167 P.2d 483] ; 
Leslie v. Federtil PiMflC6 Co., IfIC., 14 Cal.2d 73, 80 [92 
P.2d 906]; Breitmafl v. Gtdtmofl, 88 Oal.App.2d 124, 129 
[198 P.2d 811] ; Gtdfiaft V. Colemafl, 86 Cal.App.2d 266, 270 
[194 P.2d 7281.) 
[88.] It is contended, however, that such an interpretation 
of the eases granting relief under section 3275 is not per-
missible in view of the rule laid down in Glock v. Boward II; 
Wilson CoZOft1/ Co., 123 Cal. 1 [55 P. 713, 69 Am.St.Rep. 17, 
43 L.R.A. 199], and the statement in Hmck v. LakeBemef 
Water Co., 9 Cal.2d 136 [69 P.2d 849], that "The provisioDl 
• I 
J I 
) 
) 
120 [840. 
of section 3275 are necessarily qualified by the langUage "'" 
.ection 1492, BO that generally in a case where time is m8a.~: 
the essence of the agreement a party may not obtain reli~ 
. under that section!' (9 Cal.2d at 143.) Neither ofth., 
I cases is controlling here. In the Glock case the vendee, after 
i being in default for over three years, tendered the balance of 
the contract price and demanded a deed. The vendor rejected· 
the tender and refused to convey. The vendee then BOught· 
to rescind the contract and recover ba.ck the total amount 
that he had paid. The court held that where time was of the" 
essence the vendee could not by a late tender put the vendor 
in default io as to found a cause· of action forreacission and 
restitution. The court recognized, however, that under cer~ 
tain circumstances a default, even when time was of the .:. 
sence, could be relieved against but noted that in the case before 
it no excuse was "even attempted to be made." [41 Section 
3275 presupposes that the party seeking relief is in default, 
and in order to secure relief under its terms it is necessary 
for him to plead and prove facts that will justify its appli-
cation. (PaUen v. Pepper Hotel Co., 153 Oal. 460, 471 [96 
P. 296]; PGlo • Dodini v. City of OakZGnd, 79 Cal.App.2d 
739, 749 [180 P.2d 764] ; Taylor v. V"ited 81at68 F . • G. Co., 
86 Oal.App. 382, 390 [260 P. 898] ; Clifford v. Fleshman, 65 
Oal.App. 762, 769 [225 P. 45]; TrovghiOft ,. EakZe, 58 Oal. 
App. 161, 173 [208 P. 161].) It has therefore consistently 
been held in the absence of proof of aueb facts, that once 
his default is established the vendee cannot recover back the 
part payments he has made. (GZock v. HOtDard • Wilson 
Colony Co., 123 Cal. I, 11 (55 P. n3, 69 Am.St.Rep. 17, 43 
L.R.A. 199] ; Hoppift v. Munsey, 185 Cal. 678, 686-687 [198 
P. 398]; und/ieZd v. COMn, 89 Cal.App.2d 177, 180 [200 
P.2d 149] ; WilsOft v. 8ecurity-First Nat. Bank, 84 Cal.App. 
2d 427, 430 [190 P.2d 975]; Poheim v. Meyers, 9 Cal.App. 
31, 37 [98 P. 65].) Similarly, although a quiet title action 
is equitable in nature (Goualu v. Hirose, 33 Cal.2d 213, 
216 [200 P.2d 793]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 584-
585 [241 P. 861]; Ohanian v. KlJ8aMn. 123 Cal.App. 196, 
202 (11 P.2d 42]), and equity cannot "enforce a penalty 
or forfeiture in any case" (Civ. Code, § 3369; .Leslie v. Fed-
ertJlli'inaf&C6 Co .• 1m., 14 Oal.2d 73, 79 [92 P.2d 906] ; Ebbert 
v. Mercantiu Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496, 499·500 (2 P.2d 776]; 
PZGnfe v. Gray, 68 Cal.App.2d 582, 589 [157 P.2d 421]; see 
20 Cal.L.Rev. 194), it is generally held in the absence of a 
ahowing that the . vendor will realiu. more than the benefit 
/ 
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of his bargain that he may quiet his title to the property 
without refunding any part of the price paid. (Alyers v. 
Williams, 173 Cal. 301, 304 [159 P. 982]; Schwerin Estate 
Realty Co. v. Slye, 173 Cal. 170.172·173 (159 P. 420) ; Ross v. 
Gentry,94 Cal.App. 742, 746 (271 P. 1098]; Darter v. Schuy-
ler,47 Cal.App. 457, 460 [190 P. 827}.) 
[3b] The facts in the Glock ease and similar cases suggest 
that the reason no attempt was made to rely upon section 3275 
was that the defaulting vendee could not qualify for relief 
under that section and that therefore his only hope of recover-
ing any of the money he had paid or keeping the contract alive 
was in proving that it was the vendor who was in default. In 
many cases the amount forfeited was a small fraction of the 
total price and there was no indication that it exceeded in 
amount the damage caused the vendor by the vendee', breach. 
(Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574 [229 P. 327] ; Hoppin v. Mun-
sey, 185 Cal. 678 [198 P. 398] ; Landfield v. Cohen, 89 Cal. 
App.2d 177 [200 P.2d 149) : Keelan v. Belmont Co., 13 Cal. 
App.2d 6 [165 P.2d 930]; Kelso v. Ulrich, 67 Ca1.App.2d 
698 [155 P.2d 407] ; Pokeim v. Meyers, 9 Cal.App. 31 f98 P. 
65).) On the other hand, when relief has been sought and 
denied under section 3275 the courts have frequently pointed 
out that the damages sustained by the vendor were no less 
in amount than the vendee had already paid (Buckey v.Mc-
Graw, 206 Cal. 541, 543 [275 P. 221]; Sawyer v. Sterling 
Realty Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 715, 725 [107 P.2d 449) ; see, also, 
Weatherbee v. Sinn, 73 Cal.App. 98, ]04 [238 P. 134]), or 
that the nature of the condition that was breached was such 
that it was impossible to compute the actual damages in-
volved. (Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647,654. 656 f32 P. 7021 : 
Palo &- Dodini v. City of Oakland, 79 Cal.App.2d 739, 750 
[180 P.2d 764].) In other eases the vendee bas been unable 
to continue with performance of the contract, and although 
such inability prevents his default from being wilful (Ebbert 
v. MercanUZe Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496, 500 f2 P.2d 776] ; see 
Rest., Contracts, § 357, com. e), it also defeats his right to 
have the contract kept in force, since he is unable to make 
full compensation for the default. (Neher v. Kauffman, 197 
Cal. 674. 684 [242 P. 713] : Grimes v. Steele, 56 Cal.App.2d 
786, 789-790 [133 P.2d 874] ; Deevy v. Lewis, 54 Cal.App.2d 
24, 28 [128 P.2d 577] ; Christin v. Story, 119 Cal.App. 326, 
333-334 [6 P.2d 301].) 
A vendee in default who is seeking to keep the contract 
,/ 
) 
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alive, however, is in a better position to secure relief than 
one who is seeking to recover back the excess of what he , 
has paid over the amount necessary to give the vendor the; 
benefit of his bargain after performance under the con-" 
tract has terminated. In the latter situation it may be 80 ,; 
difficult to compute the vendor's damages that the vendee', 
will be unable to prove that the vendor will be unjustly en- 'ie, 
riched by allowing him to keep all the money that has been 
paid. (See Glock v. Howard d7 Wilson Oolony 00., 123 Cal. I, 
7-8 [55 P. 713,69 Am.St.Rep. 17,43 L.R.A. 199] ; 3 Williston 
on Contracts [rev. ed.] § 791, p. 2230; Corbin, The Right of ' 
a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, " 
40 Yale L.J. 1013, 1026.) On the other hand, when the " 
default has not been serious and the vendee is willing and 
able to continue with his performance of the contract, the 
vendor suffers no damage by allowing the vendee to do 80. 
In this situation, if there has been substantial part perform- t 
ance or if the vendee has made substantial improvements in 
reliance on his contract, permitting the vendor to terminate 
the vendee's rights under the contract and keep the install-, 
ments that have been paid can result only in the harshest 
80rt of forfeitures. Accordingly, relief will be granted 
whether or not time has been made of the essence. (Gonzalez 
v. Hirose, 33 Cal.2d 213, 215-216 [200 P.2d 793] ; Leslie v. 
Federal Finance 00., 1m., 14 Cal.2d 73, 80-81 [92 P.2d 
906] ; Hopkins v. Woodward, 216 Cal. 619, 622 [15 P.2d 499] ; 
Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust 00.,213 Cal. 496,499-500 [2 P.2d 
776]; Breitman v. Gattman, 88 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-128 
[198 P.2d 811]; Gattion v. Ooleman, 86 Cal.App.2d 266, 269 
[194 P.2d 728]; Bedell v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806, 807 
[182 P.2d 591] ; Miller v. Modern Motor 00., 107 Cal.App. 
38, 44-45 [290 P. 122] ; Oollins v. Eksoozian, 61 Cal.App. 184, 
198 [214 P. 670] ; McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal.App. 244, 
246-247 [116 P. 380] ; see 3 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.] 
§ 791, p. 2229; Rest., Contracts, § 374, illus. 5-6.) 
In Henck v. Lake Hemet Water 00., 9 Cal.2d 136 [69 
P.2d 849], the only forfeiture that was involved was a loss 
of the benefit of the bargain, and the situation was therefore 
analogous to that where the contract is still wholly executory 
and no substantial expenditures have been made in reliance 
on it. It is settled that in such situations relief from default 
cannot be granted, when time has been made of the essence 
of the contract and there has been no waiver of or estoppel 
to assert the time provision. (Martin v. Morgan, 87 Cal. 203, 
) 
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208-209 [25 P. 350, 22 Am.St.Rep. 240] ; Grey v. 2"ubb., 43 
Cal; 859, 364; Pitt v. JltJlZalieu, 85 Cal.App.2d 77, 80-81 [192 
P.2d 24]; Thome v. Gordon, 105 Cal.App. 369, 371 [287 P. 
542]; Urban v. Yoakum, 89 Cal.App. 202, 204, 208-209 [264 
P. 493] ; Civ. Code, § 1492; see 3 Williston on Contracts [rev. 
ed.J § 852, p. 2388 ; Rest., Contracts, § 874, illus. 1-2.) Since 
in the present case there has been substantial part perform-
ance of the contract and defendants have properly raised the 
question of their right to relief under section 3275, there is 
nothing in either the Glock or the Benck cases that prevents 
the granting of relief for the breach of the provision requiring 
that payments be made strictly on time. 
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that relief must be denied 
because of the finding of the trial court "That defendants' 
failure to meet said obligation by issuing checks drawn upon 
a Bank in which he had not sufficient funds was grossly neg-
ligent and a wilful breach of duty." The evidence does not 
sustain this finding. Both defendants testified that they did 
not know the checks had been dishonored until they received 
plaintiff's notice of forfeiture and that they both believed 
they had sufficient funds in the bank to cover them. At most 
the overdrafts appear to have been the result of an error in 
computation coupled with delays in making the usual deposits 
caused by defendant husband'8 illness. Plaintiff contends, 
however, that the finding of a wilful default must be sus-
tained because defendant husband voluntarily failed to make 
inquiry when the June check was not returned marked "paid" 
with his. June bank statement, particularly when that state-
ment contained a charge for one llllidenti1led overdraft. The 
issue is not, however, whether defendants voluntarily failed 
to investigate whether the June check had been honored but 
whether they wilfully or as a result of gross negligence 
breached their contract. (PGr,ons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 655 
[32 P. 702J.) That defendants in good faith believed they 
had suflicient funds to cover the checks prevents their breach 
from being wilful, and their failure fully to investigate the 
implications of their June bank statement at most amounts 
to simple negligence. It does not evidence that "entire want 
of care which would raise a presumption of the conscious 
indifference to consequences" necessary to constitute gross 
negligence. (Redington v. PGCific P. T. C. Co., 107 Cal. 317, 
324 [40 P. 432, 48 Am.St.Rep. 132J; Coit v.Western Union 
Tel. Co., 130 Cal. 657, 664 [63 P. 83, 80 Am.St.Rep. 158, 53 
) 
) 
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L.R.A. 678] ; Krause v. Barity, 210 Cal. 644, 655 [293 P. 62, 
'17 A.L.R. 1327].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J OJ concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. Although, on its face, this case 
may seem in some of its aspects to be a hard one for affirmanee, 
I think that we should either follow the law on the record 
as it actually exists, or frankly declare that the law is changed. 
Glock v. Howa.rd (1898), 123 Cal. 1 [55 P. '113, 69 Am.St. 
Rep. 17, 43 L.R.A. 1991. and Henek v. lAke Hemet Wate,. 
Co. (1937), 9 Ca1.2d 136 [69 P.2d 849], contain statements 
which are inconsistent with the majority opinion; I think 
that they should be followed or squarely overruled insofar 
as they are inconsistent. 
As to the finding of gross negligence and wilful breach of 
contract the majority. in the face of substantial evidence, 
substitute their conclusion of fact for that of the trial court; 
the majority hold that as a matter of law the use by defend-
ants, in making paymentR on the time-essence contract on 
two occasions within three months, of checks drawn on an 
account without sufficient funds to cover such checks, does 
not support the specific finding of the trial court that such 
conduct was either wilful or grossly negligent. If using bad 
checks two times in three months' does not support a finding 
of wilfulness or gross negligence would three times in three 
months he sufficient' If not, would 12 times in 12 months 
perhaps suffiee' And, if there be implications of negligence 
or wilfulness in the conduct related, what excuses shan the 
trial court be required, as a matter of law, to accept as over-
weighing the conflicting implications' How far are we going 
in the trend toward de t&Ot10 consideration on appeal of con-
fiicIts in ledvidenfcef 1 • h ·al· .1 
wou pre er to eave Wit tri Judges and JurieS the ' 
fact finding function which onee was exclusively theirs. (For ~ 
mustration of the trend toward appellate supervision of fact 1 
finding on the weight of evidenee see I,enberg v. Ca.lifomia. 
EmplOf/fftenf 8ta.b. Com. (1947), 30 Cal.2d 34, 45~46 [180 
P.2d 111; Union Oil Co. v. Union 8t1ga.r Co. (1948),31 Cal.2d 
300,319 et aeq. [188 P.2d 470].) 
I 
! 
\ 
